As triple!helix like research funding is growing in popularity, the need for evaluating the suc! cess of such programs is growing. During the last 30 years, a number of attempts have been made to assess whether certain technology funding has been successful or not. The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of these attempts as well as suggest that we must look beyond simple valuemeters as patent creation rate in order to fully understand the process of technology transfer.
Introduction
The increasing popularity of the triple helix as a method of funding research in order to maximize the dissemination of knowledge from university to society, there is a need for fur! ther understanding how this dissemination actually takes place as well as estimating and as! sessing the effects of the research project.
Even though universities has long been regarded a major part of knowledge, technology trans! fer as a field of research is not more than 30 years old #Niosi 2006$.
!Until the 1960s, most studies of innovation were anecdotal and biographical or purely technical.

"…#
Even those economists, such as Schumpeter, who put innovation at the centre of his entire theory of economic growth and development, did not study the specific features of actual innovations in depth. ! #Freeman 1991$
When deciding when to fund a research program or not, the question at hand is whether the project will generate results or not. If one has the luxury of choosing between projects, or the burden of producing evidence that research money is well spent, one has to compare projects and estimate the %value& they have created. To further complicate things, you have to provide these estimates on return on investment upon the decision to fund or not, even though ef! fects of research will not be seen until many years after the research has been conducted. In order to be able to predict whether a project will lead to a successful commercialization of a product or the transfer of a technology, we need to study the innovation process more closely, as this is where the foundation is being laid of which the technology transfer itself in many ways only is a natural cause.
!As the parameters of any particular innovations system are not known in
advance $and are difficult to measure even in retrospect%& ' Heher 2006. Despite of having a huge research budget, even NASA have little knowledge on how technol! ogy is being transferred from their research #Hertzfeld 2002$.
!It is necessary to develop more rigorous metrics to assess commercialization activities; commonly collected figures on number of spin'outs and their em' ployees are not sufficiently informative.& #Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004$
The triple helix
The triple helix has been described as an &Innovation in innovation& #Etzkowitz 2003$. The idea is that knowledge!producing institutions are developing organizational capacity not only to produce ideas but also to put them into use.
Even though the University traditionally has been a supportive structure for innovation, the triple helix perspective is encouraging the university to actively become involved in the for! mation of firms and thus evolve into what is referred to as the Entrepreneurial University.
Assessing technology transfer within a triple helix set!up is more complex than in a tradi! tional setting as we have multiple actors, each with a different agenda, participating in the project. What is to be considered a success or not may severely contradict between the actors as each party have a different set of goals to participate in the constellation as compared to a more traditional research project where a single certain organization is involved.
Defining technology transfer
In order to measure the effects of technology transfer we first have to define what it is. Most commonly it has been defined as licensing of technology from an entity to another. #cf. Phil! ips 2002$ In most cases studied the transfer is taking place from a university to another entity such as a major corporation or an incubating company. There may exist several reasons for academic studies to focus on the technology transfer process originating in universities. One is of course the simplified access to the empirical data, by studying your own environment. Another is most likely related to the aftermath of the 1980 U.S. Baye!Dole act creating a radical change in the way Intellectual Property #IP$ was treated in Universities. Entrepreneurial opportunities are often embedded in tacit knowledge and the ability to spot an improvement in the production process due to explicit knowledge of a certain market. In these cases technology is more efficiently transferred through other means, which is often neglected in scholarly studies.
Attempts of taxonomies
This attempt to produce an overview of this field is not the field, and will most likely not be the last. There exist a large number of methods in which technology is being transferred. The most commonly identified one in literature has been described in the following figure and sections.
Transfer method Description
Licensing Technology is being protected by immaterial law #patents, copy! right, etc.$ and is being licensed to other company.
Spinning'out/Spinning'off Technology is being moved to a separate, new organization in order to be commercialized.
Spinning'in
Technology developed in a cluster/coalition is being commercial! ized by one of the participating organizations.
Incubators
A new company is built within a business incubator, an organiza! tion specialized in building new companies.
Procurement
A non!existing product is being bought before being developed, this creating economic incentive to develop it.
Spillover & Absorption
Knowledge is transferred by for example papers, brochures, word! of!month, and being absorbed by another company. Considering this, one might argue that the process of producing patents and licensing inven! tions rather than simply publishing them is not worth the effort. The counter!argument to this is that the small cost of the Technology Transfer offices #often stated to be 0.3!1($ is a small price to pay even though the rate of return is low.
Lowe #2006$ suggests that, using a game theoretic approach, when knowledge related to an invention is largely tacit #as discussed by Polyani 1958$, the inventor either will have to de! velop the idea via an inventor!founded start!up himself as the knowledge is problematic to transfer, or through a co!operation where the inventor earns royalty so that he is motivated to work to educate the transferee.
Zhao & Reddy #1993$ suggests that the negotiation of technology transfer agreements, espe! cially in an international context, is not only a question of rationally estimating the value of the innovation but also a dynamic interaction between parties which is as much a social proc! ess as it is an economic one.
Anton & Yao #1994$ analyze the problem of financially weak independent inventors selling a valuable but easily imitated invention, which cannot be protected by property rights. The theory of technology licensing assumes that there exists a )perfect market* for buying and selling knowledge. A market which has been proved not to work as frictionless as perhaps sometimes assumed, creating the need for other transfer mechanisms.
Spinning-out / Spinning-off
When a company or research project creates a technology which is interesting in itself, but not directly related to the core business of the organization, an option is to transfer this technology to a separate #new$ company.
As previously stated, this has in some countries been the policy to ensure that knowledge cre! ated in universities is being utilized in commercial products, thus dissipated into society.
The Lambert Review #2003, p. 5$ suggests that there has been too much emphasis on develop! ing university spinouts, many of which proving to be unsustainable instead of focusing on li! censing the technology. Chiesa and Piccaluga, 1998; Rappert and Webster, 1998; Smilor et al. 1990; Stankiewicz, 1994; Weatherston, 1993%& #Druilhe & Garnsey 2004 Due to this and other raised critique of the spinout as a way to create bad businessmen from great scientists, policy makers in many levels moving away from this idea. Instead there is a growing appreciation for the principles lying behind the triple!helix!constellation and the prospects of generating spillovers and spin!in as a result of researchers and corporation meet! ing in research!projects consisting of many actors.
!On
Incubators
A special field of spin!out studies is when the technology is being commercialized by an incu! bator. While much of the research studying spin!outs in general still is valid for these new companies it is also important to note the research which has been done specifically to asses the efficiency of technology business incubators.
Most notably is the research carried out by Philips #2002$, who studied a number of technol! ogy business incubators found that few actually were using university!based technology. Phil! He further found that incubator programs are not efficient technology transfer mechanism, despite the fact that many were established with that goal in mind.
Spinning-in
In research!projects with multiple actors technology created by the project group must be spun!back into one or several of the organization in order to be commercialized. How this is being done has not yet been fully discussed by researchers, needing further attention in a world where triple!helix constellations is growing more common due to its increased popular! ity within the areas of research policy and funding.
Procurement
In order to decrease risks of developing a new technology or product it is possible to motivate this development by procurement. Traditionally this method has been used by governments in order to develop military technology or in order to stimulate the development of national companies instead of purchasing a similar technology from outside the country.
Sweden once had a great tradition of governmental procurement where companies such as
Ericsson, ASEA #ABB$, and AGA to name a few were getting orders to develop new products.
Instead of purchasing existing Lighthouses from abroad, Swedish naval authorities asked AGA to develop own so that they could be utilized. The research and development costs where thus guaranteed by a first customer, while they were able to keep the ownership of the technology. Several Swedish companies, which grew large during the 20th century, were founded upon this principle.
Today, partly as a process of becoming a member of the European Union as well as other changes in purchasing policies, this method is now limited to the procurement of military product, while it is still being utilized more in other countries.
Spillover & absorption
Much knowledge and technology is being dissipated through society in less formal methods.
Knowledge is *spilling over* between organizations, industries and countries in many ways, such as the publishing of academic papers, people changing workplaces, methods of reverse! engineering products, industrial espionage and even late night pub crawls. This knowledge can then be absorbed and utilized by R&D departments in other organizations.
!Knowledge spillovers are important to the productivity of firms $Jaffe, 1986% and to economic growth $Griliches, 1992; Romer, 1990%.& 
Measuring technology transfer
The approaches to measure the success and effects of technology being transferred could be divided into either quantitative or qualitative approaches. In this section, some of the at! tempts, which have been reported through academic publishing, will be presented.
Quantitative approaches
Bozeman #2000$ describes a number of different policy paradigms which exists in the litera! Bernad et al #1995$ presents a case study on measuring the performance of technology trans! fer, using measurements models from Chapman #1994$ they study the efficiency of the tech! nology transfer center at the University of Alabama. Finding that the input measurements are easy to collect and tabulate, but that output measures are difficult to obtain merely 1.5 years after the creation of the office.
Hertzfeld #2002$ used a methodology previously used to measure the European Space Pro! grams #Bach, 1992$, by identifying a number of positive outputs #such as new products, com! mercial benefits due to reputation, development of labor skill, etc. $ and creating measure! ments for them unable to assess the value added to a company participating in a NASA re! search program.
The
Counting patents
The far most common method found evaluating R&D funding found in this literature study is the use of patents as a valuemeter.
Several scholars #c.f. Jaffe and Lerner 2001$ uses patents per R&D dollar as a mean to com! pare the efficiency of universities versus research laboratories, while recognizing that it would be desirable to other indicators of technology transfer they are unfortunate enough to have limited and inconsistent data in other areas.
Patents are indeed a convenient valuemeter as it is easily countable, exists in public registers and is an unquestionable sign of a research result.
However, as quantitively attractive this measure is, the quantitively unattractive it is. The patent may be a sign of research, but it is far from representative to measure the effects of a certain technology transfer effort.
Measuring patent output over time is a problematic process as the patent system has gone through a number of changes in policies and practices. #Jaffe 1999$ It is therefore hard to sin! gle out whether an increase in patents from a certain institute is the result of more innovative or efficient research operations rather than patent policy changes. 
Return on Investment (ROI)
Heher #2006$ seeks to predict future returns of investments in public research. By using a combination of institutional return on investment models and a simple economic projection he seeks to address unrealistic expectations from countries now seeking to increase their ef! forts to commercialize their research results.
The normal process of technology transfer involves a number of steps, each taking a few years. Therefore, there is typically 6!10 years elapsing from the initial disclosure of an inven! tion until a patent license is generating a significant income. Considering this, time from in! vestment until a potential payback of invested money is most likely 10!20 years ahead of time.
Besette #2003$ approaches the increasing problem of calculating profitability from research by suggesting Return on Investment #ROI$ as a comparative measure as compared to previous university tradition to measure peer review, which has little benefit for economic stakeholder.
By estimating all costs and benefits for each stakeholder a return of investment can be calcu! lated for each stakeholder #as different stakeholders may benefit from different outputs$ or weighted together to a compound index. Besette suggests a number of potential outputs, not without recognizing that quantification and measurement of these might be problematic in many cases.
Qualitative approaches
While there have been a lot of attempts to quantitatively assess the effects of technology transfer, qualitative approaches have not been as thoughtfully discussed in the current litera! ture.
Colyvas et al. #2002$ seeks to learn more how university inventions get into practice by study! ing a number of cases. Garnsey #2004$ studies university spin!outs using a Cambridge University database and argues that we need a better understanding of the heterogeneity of spin!outs as the diversity have both theoretical and policy implications.
Assessment challenges
In this section a number of challenges identified in the literature is being presented in order to create a list of issues, which needs further attention when designing studies associated with technology transfer in the future.
Perspectives
When assessing the success of a project it is important to define from which perspective one is performing the assessment. A certain project might be a success from a societal perspec! tive, but a failure for a participating organization or individual #or vice verse$.
There also exists a delimitation problem in which benefits and costs that should be related to the project itself, as illustrated by Bozeman: Due to the fact that most studies of spin!outs concern ventures that have actually become operational enterprises #From Druilhe & Garnsey 2004: Blair and Hitchens, 1998; Brett et al., 1991; Chiesa and Piccaluga, 1998; Downes and Eadie, 1998; Rappert and Webster 1998, Rob! erts and Malone, 1996; Smior et al. 1990 $ there exists a bias which we must take into consid! eration. 
!If a new drill bit project enables deeper drilling opening up North
!The survival bias in these studies reflects the difficulty of obtaining evidence on scientists( intentions to commercialize research findings if these do not ac
Skewness of returns
Scherer & Harhoff #2000$ combines eight sets of data on inventions and innovations in order to assess the size and distribution of financial returns. They found that the outcomes where skew where the lion*s share of all value originated from a small number of projects. This sug! gests that one must use portfolio theory, supporting a large number of projects in order to limit risk. This skewness increases further the need for early assessment of project potential.
Time to market
It is hard to generalize the time it takes from invention to commercialization; further, differ! there exits many differences in how technology is being, and can be transferred depending on the nature of the project. In some cases space!technologies are to specific so that the cost and effort of modifying these for other industry!use takes longer time than developing the tech! nology without space!technology co!operation. Further they recognize that the potential for successful TT is dependent upon whether the research programs are mission! or diffusion! related, and that generic technologies need a very long time in order to generate large profits whereas specific technologies generally reaches an industrial application more rapidly. 
Absorbing knowledge
Cohen & Levinthal #1989$ claims that economics in general previously have assumed that technological knowledge, which is in the public domain, can be costless realized by all firms.
Arguing that there is a cost in absorbing and applying technology, therefore, organizations are dependent on their own internal R&D capacity even if other party is conducting most re! search. One reason for this is that outside knowledge is less targeted to the particular need of the firm and therefore must be recognized and adapted in order to be adopted.
!Economists conventionally think of R&D as generating one product: new information. We suggest that R&D not only regenerates new information, but also enhances the firm(s ability to assimilate and exploit existing informa' tion.& #Cohen & Levinthal 1989$
!Scholars of technological change have observed that firms invest in own
R&D to be able to utilize information which is available externally $e.g. Til' ton, 1971; Allen, 1977; Mowery, 1983%& 
Other factors affecting technology transfer
Finally, one must recognize that technology transfer is highly affected by other factors, such as policies, bureaucracy and many others.
Policies
Several scholars suggest that the policies regarding technology transfer play an important role in how innovations will be patented and commercialized #cf. 
Bureaucracy
Hertzfeld #2002$ identifies that bureaucracy such as complex and time!consuming federal government procurement procedures, IP!rights, etc. slows down the introduction to the mar! ketplace, in worst case making the inventions aged and without commercial value once they are ready to be commercialized. In some cases one could make the argument that it might be better not to patent inventions. There are cases where a patent also acts as a warrant for the licensee, investing in commercializing the product, that they will be the only company pursu! ing this.
Findings from the SAPPHO project
The SAPPHO project measured around a hundred characteristics of 40 paris of innovations. The market for technology transfer and its limits There exists a need to build a qualitative research agenda by incorporating theories of entre! preneurship, innovation and creativity into a multi!disciplinary approach. It is only by under! standing these processes can be able to predict whether certain research projects may be suc! cessful or not, counting the number of patents afterwards yields little knowledge about which initial parameters was responsible for the success or failures.
The increasing popularity of funding triple!helix constellations also builds the need for a deeper understanding in the problems and potential of Spin!ins, transferring technology from with what we usually regard as "basic human needs". It is rather so, it could be argued, that the economy at large is governed by human's unbounded thirst for jewellery, toys and entertainment. For some reason -the inherent urge of science for being taken seriously, maybe -these aspects have been recognised only in a very limited way within technological and economical research.
The seriousness of science is grey, Goethe said, whereas the colour of life glows green. We want to
bring forward yet another colour, that of frivolity, and it is pink.
The Pink Machine Papers is our attempt to widen the perspective a bit, to give science a streak of pink. We would like to create a forum for half-finished scientific reports, of philosophical guesses and drafts. We want thus to conduct a dialogue which is based on current research and which gives us the opportunity to present our scientific ideas before we develop them into concluding and rigid -greyreports and theses.
Finally: the name "Pink Machine" comes from an interview carried out in connection with heavy industrial constructions, where the buyer of a diesel power plant worth several hundred million dollars confessed that he would have preferred his machines to be pink.
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